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ABSTRACT
NEW INSIGHTS INTO CORRUPTION: PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF
APPROACH-ORIENTATION FOR POWERHOLDERS.
FEBRURARY 2013
MINDI S. ROCK, B.A., OBERLIN COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
Does power lead to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), and if so, why? Here, a novel mechanism
is proposed for understanding the complex relationship between power and corruption by
incorporating recent work on morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). By
bridging the power, self-regulation, and morality literatures we proposed that powerful
individuals, because of their approach tendencies, are oriented more towards moral
prescriptions or “shoulds” and thus focus more on moral acts and moral intentions while
minimizing the importance of moral proscriptions (neglect pathway). We proposed an
alternative path to corruption for powerholders via moral self-regard. Powerholders,
because of their approach-based moral focus, would experience an automatic boost of
implicit moral self-regard that would license future immorality. In three studies we found
suggestive evidence that the approach tendencies of participants primed with power
maximized the role of good moral acts and intentions and minimized the impact of moral
transgressions, because the individual’s monitoring system focused on and valued
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instances of moral successes rather than moral failures (neglect pathway). We did not
find support for the moral self-regard pathway.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When considering the relationship between power and morality one’s thoughts
naturally turn to corruption. One reason for this intuitive link between power and
corruption is that there are numerous examples of powerful individuals who display poor
or no moral judgment, such as disgraced Governors Eliot Spitzer and Rod Blagojevich
and corrupt financier, Bernard Madoff. Past research in psychology has broadly explored
whether power leads to corruption (Kipnis, 1972), but a less examined question concerns
specific psychological processes that underlie why powerholders may commit moral
transgressions. The current research offers a theoretical framework for the relationship
between power and corruption by incorporating recent work on moral regulation (JanoffBulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) as a possible mechanism.
In this research we investigated potential mechanisms by which power leads to
corruption. As discussed below, we do not believe power necessarily leads to corruption,
but rather that power produces certain “vulnerabilities” to corruption. More specifically,
we argue that power activates a type of moral regulation that influences how
powerholders attend to and evaluate their good and bad behavior, which, ironically,
makes them more likely to commit moral transgressions. Self-regulation research helps
to explain the paradoxical process of powerholders’ evaluations of moral acts, and we
argue that it is their approach orientation, which promotes a focus on moral goods over
immoral deeds, that deserves special attention.
To account for the considerable range of findings in the power literature, Keltner,
Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) proposed an integrative framework based on self-
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regulation for high versus low powerholders. The authors’ framework suggests that
having power is associated with increased rewards and freedom, which promotes
approach-related motivation. In contrast, reduced power is associated with increased
threat, punishments, and constraints, and activates avoidance or inhibition-related
motivation. More broadly, having power is linked to an increased focus on positive end
states and activates approach tendencies, whereas reduced power is associated with an
increased focus on negative end states and activates inhibition tendencies.
Recent work by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) extended this
fundamental regulatory distinction of approach versus avoidance to the moral domain.
Their research examined whether individuals hold different and opposing moral goals,
which reflect promoting (approaching) morality versus avoiding (inhibiting) immorality.
In their model, moral prescriptions represent a distinct mode of regulation that focuses on
behaviors that individuals should engage in to be moral, such as helping a friend, working
hard, and volunteering time to a charity. Moral proscriptions represent a mode of
regulation that focuses on behaviors individuals should not engage in to avoid
immorality, such as cheating, lying, and stealing. Overall, prescriptive and proscriptive
moral regulation offer insights into the fundamental difference between activating “good”
behaviors versus inhibiting “bad” behaviors, and we propose that this framework sheds
new light on the link between power and corruption.
In the current project we explored two paths by which the approach tendencies of
powerholders may lead to corruption. The first pathway involves the under-regulation of
the proscriptive system and a minimization of immoral acts and intentions. This leads to
the relative neglect of immoral behavior. The second pathway features the over
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regulation of the prescriptive system and involves an automatic boost in moral selfregard. Monitoring for moral “hits” such as good actions and behaviors may reward
moral thoughts and intentions and lead to increased moral self-regard. This in turn may
license future immorality. Ironically, in both cases, we predicted that powerholders’
approach-based moral orientation would increase the likelihood of corruption.
A corollary hypothesis to consider is the link between lacking power and moral
regulation. Keltner et al. (2003) suggest that lacking power heightens one’s focus on
negative end states that include threat, punishment and social constraints, and thus
activates inhibition tendencies. Lacking power should regulate moral behavior by
focusing primarily on proscriptions--what they “should not” be doing to avoid being
immoral–which could lead to fewer moral transgressions. However, we believe there are
additional, complex factors to be considered in understanding the impact of low power on
moral or immoral outcomes. Thus the powerless may have particular concerns about
injustices or special sensitivities towards others in need. In other words, we do not
believe that the relationship between morality and the lack of power is a simple mirror of
the relationship between morality and having power, and we believe these warrant
independent explorations. The current research therefore focused on power and
powerholders, self-regulatory orientations, and their possible links to corruption.
Power
What is power?
The concept of power has proven challenging for researchers to capture in a
singular definition. To paraphrase Bierstedt’s (1950) insightful commentary on this
issue, humans have a lay understanding of power, but when asked what it is precisely, a
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definition is elusive. Some researchers consider the broadest features of power to be the
ability to act upon the environment or another individual, while simultaneously remaining
unconstrained by these external sources (e.g., Bugental & Lin, 2001; Cartwright, 1959;
Hollander, 1985; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Guinote, 2007; Keltner, et al., 2003; Weber,
1947). Some examples of language that communicates this definition include Dahl’s
(1957) description of power as “the ability to compel others to do what you want them to
do” and Thibaut and Kelly’s (1959) “power over.” Others look to the importance of
influence, defining power in terms of “capacity or potential to influence, modify or
control others’ states” (Copeland, 1994; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French & Raven,
1959; Imai, 1993; Manz & Gioia, 1983; Parker & Rubenstein, 1981; Rusbult, Verette,
Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991; Thibaut et al., 1959).
The current research focused on the social nature of power, with an eye towards
individuals in power who exercise their ability to influence with the intent to gain certain
outcomes. The simplest and most frequently used definition of power that conveys this
meaning is “outcome control.” In a given interaction the high power individual makes
decisions that determine the outcomes of a target (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Copeland,
1994; Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; French et al., 1959; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee,
2003; Guinote, 2007; Imai, 1993; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Lammers,
Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Manz et al., 1983; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Parker et al., 1981;
Rusbult et al., 1991; Thibaut et al., 1959). Additionally, powerful individuals have
increased access to resources (money, rewards, knowledge, prestige), which frees their
thoughts and actions from ordinary restrictions (Keltner, et al., 2003). Past and present
research offers examples of experiments in which power is operationalized using
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outcome control, and the current research relied on this definition, as it is most relevant to
this work.
To test the effects of power, empirical research has used both explicit (e.g.,
narrative priming and assigned power roles) and implicit (e.g., subliminal lexical
priming) tasks to manipulate one’s experience of power. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and
Magee (2003) established the use of narrative priming to explore whether simply
recalling an experience of power produced the same results as being assigned a position
of power. In their research, the narrative prime included three between-subjects
conditions and individuals had three minutes to remember a personally relevant
experience with social power. High power participants wrote about a time when they had
control over someone else, low power participants wrote about a time when someone else
controlled them, and participants in the control condition wrote about the previous day.
The essays were then coded for how much power participants reported having. Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that individuals described themselves as having
more power in the high power narrative prime condition compared to those in the low
power narrative prime condition. The authors noted that the control condition was not
coded for power, because very few individuals wrote about an experience of power.
Another effective method used to explicitly prime power involved assigning
participants to specific power roles, such as boss or employee. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and
Magee (2003) used this approach in their research as well; first participants were asked
about past leadership experience and then were randomly assigned to either high or low
power roles (e.g., manager or subordinate). To measure the effect of power role
assignment, participants answered several questions including how much they felt they
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were in charge of the task and to what extent they had power over the subordinates. As
expected, their results revealed significant differences between the high and low power
roles, such that individuals in the high power roles reported feeling much more control
over both the task and subordinates. Both methods have been validated with a variety of
participant samples (see also Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Guinote, 2007; Smith & Bargh,
2008: Smith & Trope, 2006).
In addition to explicit measures, researchers have also developed subliminal
techniques to prime power, such as scrambled word, sentence-fragments completion, and
scrambled-sentence tasks (see Chen, Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001; see also Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000; Smith & Trope, 2006). In one example, Smith and Trope (2006) used a
scrambled-sentence task that presented participants with five words from which they
were to construct a grammatically correct sentence using four of the words. The
researchers provided a sample sentence containing the words: juicy, are, the, oranges,
ripe, with one possible solution being, “The oranges are ripe.” During the experiment,
participants unscrambled 16 sets of words with half of the sets containing target words
related to high power, low power, or control primes. Target words for the high power
condition included authority, captain, commands, controls, dominates, executive,
influenced, privileged. The low power condition included words relevant to lacking
power such as complied, janitor, obey, passive, servant, submits, subordinate, yield. The
control condition contained 16 sets of power-irrelevant words. Smith and Trope (2006)
confirmed that the sentence-scramble task produced comparable power differences to the
explicit power primes.
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The Influence of Power
Past researchers have studied a range of psychological outcomes associated with
power. Some of the known behavioral outcomes include initiating more physical contact
(Henley, 1973) and speaking more (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating,
1988).
Attention to Rewards
Elevated power increases an individual’s sensitivity to rewards and opportunities
(Keltner, Anderson, & Gruenfeld, 2003). According to this reasoning, powerful people
should be quicker to detect opportunities for material and social rewards. This prediction
is supported by Higgins’s (1997) assertion that approach is facilitated by the direction of
attention toward rewards and means for obtaining those rewards. Further research has
revealed several correlates of behavioral approach are associated with attention to
rewards, including increased dopamine (DePue, 1995).
Evidence supporting the prediction that power increases sensitivity to rewards and
opportunities comes from work using Thematic Apperception Tests (TATs; Atkinson,
1964) to measure need to approach. This line of work reveals that individuals in group
leadership roles (Zander & Forward, 1968), European Americans compared with African
Americans (Adkins, Payne, & Ballif, 1972) and children from higher status social groups
(Nygard, 1969), all demonstrate high levels of the need to approach, which detects
sensitivity to rewards. Another related finding is that elevated power increases
perceptions of rewards and opportunities in ambiguous interactions and acts. Work that
supports this prediction comes from men who occupy positions of power and perceive
sexual interest in women’s ambiguous behavior (Abbey, 1982; Keltner et al., 1998).
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Positive Affect
There is a growing literature on the influence of power on affect (Berdahl &
Martorana, 2006; Clark, 1990; Collins, 1991; Kemper, 1991; Tiedens et al., 2000).
Keltner et al. (2003) posited that elevated power increases the experience and expression
of positive affect including discrete emotions such as desire, enthusiasm, and pride. In
contrast, reduced power is predicted to cause negative emotion and anxiousness including
the discrete emotions fear, shame, awe and embarrassment.
To test the relationship between power and affect, Anderson, Langner, and
Keltner (2001) asked participants to report their general sense of power (e.g., “I
experience power in my day to day life) and their general tendency to experience
different emotions. Their work showed that power correlated with the increased
experience of many positive emotions (e.g., amusement, desire, enthusiasm, happiness,
and love). Other research suggests that power influences expressive behavior. Using a
fraternity hierarchy, the individual’s power was defined by their position in the fraternity:
active brother (high power) versus recent pledge (low power). Keltner et al. (1998) found
that high power members were more likely to display smiles of pleasure than were low
power members.
Additional research by Berdahl and Martorana’s (2006) manipulated power and
measured the effect on expressed affect. Using Keltner et al.’s (2003) framework,
Berdahl and Martorana predicted that having power would increase the experience and
expression of positive emotions and that lacking power would increase the expression of
negative emotions. In their study, power was primed by randomly assigning participants
to power roles allegedly based on careful evaluation of a leadership questionnaire.
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Following role assignment, the experimenter brought groups of three research
participants into individual rooms to complete a discussion task. The leader was
responsible for managing the discussion about a social issue and recording the agreed
upon group opinion. Following this group interaction, both leaders and subordinates
completed a post-discussion question that asked about their feelings of power and their
expression of emotion during group interactions. Berdahl and Martorana found that
leaders experienced more positive emotions, such as happiness and interest, compared to
subordinates who reported experiencing more negative emotions such as contempt,
discomfort, disgust, embarrassment, fear, guilt and shame.
Automatic Cognition
Social cognition work demonstrates that individuals with power pay less attention
to others, while relying more on stereotypes (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske,
1998; Keltner & Robinson, 1996, 1997). Fiske’s (1993) “power as control (PAC) model”
theorizes that high power roles, such as bosses, stereotype low power roles, such as
employees, for three reasons: increased cognitive load, lack of outcome dependency, and
self-selection of high power roles. High power individuals may experience increased
cognitive load because of their high number of responsibilities, and in order to promote
efficiency high power individuals may utilize cognitive shortcuts, including stereotypes
and heuristics. Second, the outcomes of high power individuals are not dependent on low
power individuals, so there is less motivation to pay attention to low power individuals.
Finally, high power roles may attract individuals with dominant personalities, and these
individuals may be more likely to stereotype subordinates. Other research finds that
powerholders pay less attention to low power targets, resulting in less individuation and
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greater use of stereotypes (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Goodwin,
Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner & Robinson, 1996, 1997). Additionally,
Gruenfeld (2005) found that when primed with power individuals use less systematic
social cognition and less complex cognitive processing (cf. Guinote, 2007, on power and
attentional flexibility).
Disinhibition Effects
Interestingly, recent work reveals that across different social contexts power is
often associated with socially inappropriate and disinhibited behavior. Work by Keltner
and Ward (1998) focused on how priming power affects socially appropriate behavior
(e.g., eating). Participants were brought into a lab and told to discuss several contentious
social issues. One participant was randomly assigned to the high power role that required
him or her to assign points to two other participants based on their contributions to
written policy recommendations. Partway through the study the experimenter returned
with a plate of five cookies. Given that each group consisted of three participants each
person could take a single cookie. Of interest was which individual would consume a
second cookie. Consistent with their predictions, Keltner and Ward (1998) reported that
participants assigned to the high power role were more likely to take a second cookie.
Along with consuming more cookies, coded video interactions revealed that high power
participants were also more likely to chew with their mouths open and have crumbs on
their face and table.
Work in support of disinhibited behavior includes Gonzaga and Keltner’s (2001)
investigation of the behavioral influence of power in sexual contexts. In their
experiment, participants were coded for exhibiting two categories of behavior in a face-
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to-face interaction: disinhibition and flirtatiousness. Typical behaviors included
provocative eye contact, touches, forward leans, coy glances, and neck presentations.
Consistent with their predictions, powerful individuals were more disinhibited and
flirtatious compared to those without power. There were no significant sex differences,
suggesting that high power men and women demonstrated similar disinhibited behavior.
Likewise, Henley (1973) found that touch privilege is correlated with status, such that
high power is associated with increased attempts to initiate physical contact.
Another theme of socially inappropriate outcomes includes violations of
politeness norms. DePaulo and Friedman (1998) found that high power individuals were
more likely to talk, interrupt, and speak out of turn in an organizational context. Drawing
from a survey of approximately 750 employees, participants reported that rude and
disrespectful behaviors were three times as likely to come from individuals higher up in
the company. Further, Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, and Keating (1988) reported
that in a discussion task, individuals randomly assigned to high power roles spoke twice
as much as those assigned to low power roles.
Taken together, past research in the power literature demonstrates important
downstream effects of power on affect, behavior and cognition. Power is associated with
attention to rewards, positive affect, cognitive automaticity, and disinhibited behavior. In
the following section we review theory and research by Keltner and his colleagues (2003)
that integrates these findings into a unified framework.
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Power as Approach
Self-Regulation
A fundamental distinction in psychology concerns the difference between
approach and avoidance. This distinction is central to motivation theory and research and
has been successfully applied to many areas within psychology, from personality (Elliot
& Thrash, 2002; Emmons, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1996) to neuroscience (e.g., Gray,
1982, 1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). A substantial body of research provides
abundant evidence for the distinction between approaching positive outcomes versus
avoiding negative outcomes.
Carver and Scheier (1998) proposed that behavior is guided by two opposing
orientations: an approach orientation that is focused on achieving desired goals and an
avoidance orientation that is aimed at avoiding anti-goals. Work in neuroscience has
identified independent motivational systems based on the response to signals of reward
and punishment; in particular, a distinction has been made between a behavioral
activation system (BAS) and a behavioral inhibition system (BIS] (e.g., Gray, 1982,
1990; Sutton & Davidson, 1997), and Carver and his colleagues (Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Carver & White, 1994) present the BIS and BAS as the two fundamental components of
self-regulation. Though represented in various forms, the underlying characteristic of
each distinction is essentially the same: an approach motivation is sensitive to positive
outcomes and involves moving towards, activating and promoting, whereas an avoidance
motivation is sensitive to negative outcomes and involves restraining and inhibiting.
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In sum, approach and avoidance regulation differ in focus and action tendency.
Approach tendencies are sensitive to positive end states and involve activation. Inhibition
tendencies are sensitive to negative end states and involve restraint.
Power as Approach Regulation
An important assumption of the current research is based on Keltner, Gruenfeld,
and Anderson’s (2003) proposition that “power – influences the relative balance of the
tendencies to approach and inhibit” (p. 268). Their theory suggests that power involves
reward-rich environments and freedom from constraints that trigger positive affect,
automatic cognition, disinhibited behavior, and is related to general increased approach
tendencies and decreased inhibition tendencies
In their work examining the action tendencies of powerholders, Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that in ambiguous situations powerholders were
more likely to take action, a reflection of approach tendencies. To test the action
tendencies of powerholders, the researchers created a clever blackjack scenario, which
challenged players to get as close to 21 without going over. The experimental design
included priming power by placing participants in a structural position of power as either
the manager or a subordinate. Participants assigned to the manager position were led to
believe that they would evaluate and direct the subordinates on a Lego building task.
After the explanation of the power roles, but before the Lego task, participants completed
the blackjack scenario. Participants were dealt a hand of cards totaling 16 that required
asking for an additional card to get closer to 21 or staying with the original hand. Of
interest was whether the priming influenced the individual’s strategy to “hit,” taking
action to get closer to 21, or “stay.” In line with their predictions, Galinsky et al. (2003)
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found that the high power group of managers “hit” significantly more than the low power
group. This lends support to the claim that power increases the tendency to take action.
In a replication of the influence of power on action tendencies, the authors found that
high power participants were twice as likely to take physical action against an annoying
stimulus (e.g., turn off a fan blowing in their face) compared to those primed with low
power.
Further evidence of the influence of power on action tendencies comes from
Anderson and Galinsky’s (2006) investigation of risk estimates. Participants were
divided into two groups based on the amount of power they had in their relationships.
Then they were asked to estimate the chances that certain events, both positive and
negative, would occur in their lives. Participants primed with power estimated lower
numbers of fatalities from the causes of death than people primed with low power. The
study suggests that when people have power, they are not only more optimistic about
risks inherent in their own life, but also about risks in the world in general.
Importantly, having power is not only about increasing one’s approach
tendencies, but also about decreasing inhibition tendencies. Disinhibition involves acting
on one’s own desires in a social context without considering the effects of one’s actions.
In motivational terms, Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) argue that disinhibition
is a byproduct of approach tendencies in which the balance of motivation shifts towards
failure to inhibit behaviors. They note that those with power are more likely to go after
what they want (i.e., approach rewards), and in doing so they are less likely to attend to
others and to act in socially inappropriate ways.
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To illustrate disinhibited behavior in everyday life, Gruenfeld (Rigoglioso, 2003)
provides an anecdote of a famous magazine publisher’s behavior:
“He had in his office a small refrigerator within arm’s reach of his
desk. As far as I could tell, there were only two things in there: a
bottle of vodka and a bag of raw onions. While we were meeting, he
would reach over, open the door, drink vodka straight out of the
bottle, and eat onions. […] He seemed to think it was perfectly
appropriate to do this in a meeting.” (Rigoglioso, 2006)
The relationship between power and disinhibition provides an important connective
thread to understanding how power may lead individuals to engage in immoral acts. As
illustrated in Keltner and Ward’s experiment, powerholders were less concerned with
social consequences and were uninhibited in their actions. We propose that disinhibition
may play a role in powerholders’ tendencies to commit immoral or corrupt acts without
incurring damage to their moral self-image. It is powerholders’ approach orientation that
focuses the individual on rewarding moral actions (i.e., prescriptions) without
concentrating on inhibiting immoral behavior (i.e., proscriptions). In this way, the
balance of motivational tendencies shifts towards increased approach tendencies and
decreased inhibition tendencies and may ultimately promote overlooking immoral
behavior.
The current research built upon past work that associated power with increased
approach and decreased inhibition tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003).
The next section will review literature concerning the proposed mechanism, moral
regulation, for the current set of studies.
Power and Morality
As mentioned in the opening section of this paper, intuitively there seems to be a
direct connection between power and corruption, and this was the thesis of Kipnis’s
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(1972) seminal research. Kipnis questioned whether having power would produce
significant behavioral changes in the powerholder, with a particular focus on corrupt
consequences. To empirically test this question, Kipnis designed a business simulation in
which all participants, who were Temple University business students, were assigned to
supervise a group of teenagers in a separate building. Kipnis showed that participants
who were given control over resources (e.g., pay increase or deductions) made more
attempts to influence the subordinates than those who did not control resources. The
managers subsequently undervalued the subordinates’ performance, attributed the
subordinates’ efforts to their own control rather than subordinates’ motivations, and
sought increased distance from the subordinates.
Other researchers have also sought to understand whether power necessarily leads
to negative outcomes. Some of the findings suggest that powerful individuals are more
likely to distribute rewards to favor their own powerful group (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh,
2001) and to attend to information that confirms their expectations (Copeland, 1994). As
discussed in an earlier section, Fiske’s (1993) “power as control (PAC) model” proposed
that high power roles stereotype low power roles, which “justify the system of
inequality.” (p.182).
However, findings on the topic of power leading to negative consequences are not
consistent, and several researchers find that under certain conditions powerful individuals
exhibit superior individuation and less reliance on stereotyping (Overbeck & Park, 2001;
Ric, 1997; Louche, 1982) and also do not display in-group favoritism in reward
distribution (Ng, 1982). Although power does not necessarily lead to corruption and
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behavioral transgressions, we nevertheless believe it may make such outcomes more
likely.
Morality
Thus far we have presented past empirical links between power and selfregulation with specific evidence highlighting the relationship between power and
approach tendencies. Self-regulation provides a parsimonious explanation of multiple
psychological outcomes associated with power, but does not completely explain the
relationship between power and corruption. Corruption is broadly defined as immoral
behavior and includes such actions as lying, cheating, and stealing. Therefore, the
current analysis integrates research on self-regulation and morality as a way to
understand how power may lead to corruption and, specifically, moral transgressions.
Recent research by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009; also see Janoff-Bulman,
2011; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010, Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) focused on
distinguishing between dual moral obligations of “not harming others” versus “helping
others,” which they suggest reflect separate systems of motivation and self-regulation.
The current analysis proposes that moral regulation, focusing on good acts or avoiding
bad acts, offers an alternative way to understand the relationship between power and
corruption. Our aim is to test powerholders’ evaluation of moral and immoral acts, and
whether their sensitivity to the two systems of moral regulation predict differential
judgments of and engagement in corrupt behaviors.
Two Systems of Moral Regulation: Prescriptive versus Proscriptive
As a set of rules that facilitate group living, morality acts as a compass, helping
individuals navigate social situations by offering guidelines as to “how we should or
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should not behave in order to be valued members of society” (De Waal, 1996, p.10).
Moral judgments are based on beliefs about what is right and wrong, and moral behavior
characterizes a person as good or bad (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). As discussed earlier,
central to motivation theory and research is the distinction between approaching positive
outcomes versus avoiding negative outcomes. In the moral realm, approach and
avoidance regulatory strategies parallel the two primary motives underlying parental
responsibility: providing children with the means to survive and protecting them from
harm (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006; also see Bowlby, 1969; Higgins, 1997). In a
group context, approach-avoidance motivation functions by regulating group behavior:
advancing (i.e., approaching) desirable behaviors to promote group well-being and
inhibiting (i.e., avoiding) dangerous, undesirable behaviors.
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) propose that past work provides
suggestive evidence for two systems of morality based on motivation and self-regulation,
and in a series of seven studies they provide evidence for these two systems. One moral
system, labeled “prescriptive morality,” is based on activation motivation and focuses on
what we should do. The other moral system, labeled “proscriptive morality,” is based on
inhibition motivation and focuses on what we should not do. Further, prescriptive
morality involves activation and specifically engaging in moral actions. Proscriptive
morality, in contrast, involves inhibition and specifically restraining from immoral
behaviors. (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Following from these separate
motivational bases, prescriptive and proscriptive morality involve different behaviors.
Prescriptive morality entails behaviors that promote well-being and includes acts of
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charity and assistance. Proscriptive morality entails inhibiting harmful actions and
restraining behaviors that may violate group norms, such as cheating, lying and stealing.
Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009) profile the differences between prescriptive and proscriptive
morality in terms of linguistic representation, priming sensitivity, judgments of personal
preference, and moral crediting and disapproval. Overall, prescriptive morality, a focus
on “shoulds,” is represented more abstractly and involves inclusivity to maximize success
by engaging in moral acts; proscriptive morality, a focus on “should nots,” is represented
in more concrete language, to minimize potential failures by engaging in immoral acts.
Prescriptive morality is regarded as more discretionary and less obligatory; given that the
costs of engaging in immoral acts are considerably higher, proscriptive morality is
perceived as mandatory. Judgments about engaging in moral and immoral behavior are
also viewed very differently. Prescriptive moral primes resulted in less disapproval for
immoral behavior and more credit for moral behavior. In contrast, proscriptive moral
prime resuled in stronger disapproval of immoral acts and less credit for morality.
Overall, prescriptive and proscriptive moral regulation offer insights into the
fundamental difference between activating “good” behaviors versus inhibiting “bad”
behaviors, and we propose that this framework sheds new light on the link between
power and corruption.
Power and Moral Regulation
Following from past research that separately links power and morality with selfregulation, the current perspective proposed that the joint effect of power and morality
may provide new insights into why and how power leads to corruption. Power, which
involves activation and approach tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003),
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should focus individuals on prescriptive morality, involving good behaviors and
intentions one should engage in to promote morality (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Shepp,
2009). Paradoxically, high power individuals, because of their approach-based
prescriptive moral orientation, may be predisposed to focus primarily on good moral
actions, while overlooking damaging immoral behaviors. In the following sections we
will put forth two pathways by which high power, because of a focus on prescriptions,
may lead to corruption.
Two Paths to Corruption for Powerholders
A critical feature of self-regulation is the role of monitoring to determine whether
one is successfully reaching a goal—successfully approaching a positive outcome in the
case of approach motivation and successfully avoiding a negative outcome in the case of
avoidance motivation (Carver & Scheier, 1998). As pointed out by Janoff-Bulman
(2009), the most effective and efficient monitoring involves feature-positive monitoring
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980), which focuses on the presence
of evidence rather than its absence (e.g., Coats, Janoff-Bulman, & Alpert, 1996). In the
case of prescriptive morality, feature-positive monitoring focuses on instances of
morality—good deeds and positive intentions; these are the “hits” of this approach-based
regulatory system. In the case of proscriptive morality, feature-positive monitoring
focuses on instances of immorality, which are the “hits” of this avoidance-based
regulatory system.
We suggest that one way power may paradoxically lead to corruption is based on
the information of “what counts most” (i.e. prescriptions) when determining morality. We
label this route of power to corruption the neglect pathway, and it is characterized by the
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under-regulation of the proscriptive moral system (see Figure 1). Power via approach
maximizes the importance of good deeds and intentions that matter to morality, and
simultaneously minimizes the importance of bad deeds and temptations that contribute to
immorality. This is a processes aided and abetted by the feature-positive monitoring
processes associated with prescriptive morality and, presumably, power.
Neglect Pathway
Specifically, power should elicit approach-based, prescriptive moral regulation
that monitors for good deeds and actions. Moreover, power should minimize one’s focus
on immoral behavior such as stealing, lying and cheating, because these actions don’t fit
into the category of actions that define and promote one’s morality. They are less relevant
to one’s own moral self-evaluation. Here there is over-reliance on a single moral
regulatory system—prescriptive morality, and this results in under-regulation of immoral
acts and a failure to inhibit behavioral transgressions. Put more concretely, consider a
businessperson who simultaneously donates money to a charity and embezzles company
money for personal gain. Theoretically, power should shift the businessperson’s
attention to actions that promote prescriptive morality (such as donating to charity),
because power elicits approach-based, moral regulation. At the same time, the
businessperson fails to inhibit immoral behavior (e.g., embezzling), because his/her
prescriptive moral focus minimizes the import of these immoral acts, and thus “allows”
the person to paradoxically engage in corruption. Interestingly, the neglect pathway may
help us better understand the link between power and disinhibition (Keltner, Gruenfeld,
& Anderson, 2003), because approach tendencies of powerholders contribute to their
failure to inhibit socially inappropriate behavior.
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High Moral Self-Regard
An alternative route for powerful individuals to engage in corruption is through a
pathway that is characterized by the belief that they have earned the right to behave
immorally based on over-regulation of the prescriptive moral system (see Figure 1). That
is, powerholders, focused particularly on their positive moral thoughts and deeds, reward
their positive acts and good intentions with moral credits, which ironically licenses future
immorality. Their monitoring system over-represents good thoughts and actions, for
these are the focus of the regulatory search.
In a series of experiments, Monin and Miller (2001) make the counterintuitive
discovery that expressing morally correct judgments leads individuals to behave less
morally on a subsequent task. In their experiment, Monin and Miller (2001) had
participants make hiring decisions in which the strongest applicant was either a White
applicant from an all White applicant pool or an African American applicant from a
mixed race applicant pool. In the latter condition, White participants were given the
opportunity to make a moral, anti-prejudiced hiring decision and Monin and Miller were
interested in whether this moral decision would license the individual to be less moral on
a follow-up task. Consistent with their predictions, Monin and Miller (2001) reported
that participants who made moral decisions in the first task, made less moral decisions in
the follow up task by recommending a less qualified White applicant for a job in a racist
police department. Monin and Miller (2001) point out that by establishing anti-racist
credentials in the first task these participants gave themselves moral permission to
discriminate on the follow-up task. Interestingly, the researchers ruled out selfpresentation concerns by rerunning the study as two ostensibly unrelated tasks conducted
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by different experimenters. This suggests that individuals keep internal track of their
moral actions to ensure a balanced moral self-image. This work demonstrates the ironic
finding that behaving morally one time allows individuals to be less moral later.
Additional support comes from recent research by Mazar and Zhong (2010) who found
that individuals who previously demonstrated pro-environmentally conscious behaviors
(i.e., buying green products) were subsequently more likely to engage in less moral
behaviors (i.e., cheat on an online game).
Our second predicted pathway for how power leads to corruption is labeled high
moral self-regard. Similar to the neglect pathway, this path begins with a focus on good
moral deeds and intentions, but unlike the neglect pathway, this focus produces a boost in
moral self-regard that licenses future immorality. Specifically, high power should elicit
approach-based, prescriptive moral regulation that focuses on good deeds and intentions.
This focus on moral thoughts and actions should produce a boost in moral self-regard;
each monitoring “hit” is evidence of one’s morality (as opposed to outcomes in the
proscriptive system, in which each “hit” is evidence of one’s immorality). As Monin and
Miller (2001) show, this boost in moral self-regard licenses future immoral behavior.
Although actual moral acts are likely to be particularly valuable, it seems that positive
intentions alone—thoughts in the absence of deeds—can provide moral credit for those
with a strong prescriptive orientation like powerholders. Research on self-other biases by
Pronin and Kugler (2007) found that individuals overvalue thoughts and may ignore
behavior when engaged in self-evaluations, validating their “good” selves with good
intentions. For example, recall the businessperson (as described above) planning to
donate to a group of charities. High power focuses attention primarily on this good
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intention to donate to charities and as a consequence s/he experiences a boost in moral
self-regard. This heightened moral self-regard may then ironically produce more
immoral behavior in the future, and thus the original good moral intention licenses future
corruption.
Current Studies
In the following three studies we explored the role of moral regulation as a
possible exploratory mechanism for the relationship between power and corruption.
Specifically, we proposed that powerholders’ approach orientation would activate
prescriptive moral regulation, which is sensitive to positive moral thoughts and actions,
and by minimizing a focus on proscriptive regulation and increasing moral self-regard,
may result in moral transgressions by failing to inhibit immoral (proscriptive) behaviors.
The following studies tested the two routes to moral transgression, both based in overregulation of the prescriptive system. The neglect pathway involves the under-regulation
of the proscriptive system and consists of a minimization of immoral acts and intentions.
The high moral self-regard pathway involves an approach-based boost in moral selfregard that licenses future immoral behavior. Ironically, in both cases, powerholders’
approach-based moral regulation may increase the likelihood of corruption, but the two
routes represent independent paths from power to corruption.
The following studies used three different methodologies to test whether
powerholders’ approach orientation would activate prescriptive moral regulation that
paradoxically leads to immoral behavior. Study 1 focused on establishing that power
produces approach-based moral regulation and, specifically, valuing prescriptions while
simultaneously minimizing proscriptions. To test this relationship, we primed participants
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with power and then measured their preference for prescriptive and proscriptive items
using self-report survey measures. Study 2 assessed whether priming power produces an
automatic approach-based boost of moral self-regard as measured by the Moral Go/Nogo Association Task (MGNAT), a new implicit measure developed by our lab. Study 2
used the power manipulation and morality measures from Study 1. Study 3 built upon the
prior two studies’ findings by testing the relationship between power and prescriptive
moral regulation using actual behavioral measures of helping and cheating. After being
primed with power, participants were asked to complete a behavioral activity of helping
and cheating (counterbalanced). Study 3 allowed us to examine whether power is
associated with specific patterns of helping and cheating, particularly greater levels of
prescriptive morality and proscriptive immorality. The design allowed us to explore
whether helping (or cheating) at Time 1 differentially influenced cheating (or helping) at
Time 2 for those with and without power. Further, this design allowed us to examine
whether helping (or cheating) at Time 1 differentially influenced scores on the Moral
Go/No-go Association Task. Taken together, the three studies produced a meaningful
investigation of the relationship between power, approach-based moral regulation, and
corruptive consequences.
Specific hypotheses that were tested in the following studies are:
1.) Power leads to approach-based moral regulation (i.e., focus on prescriptions).
2.) Power promotes the overvaluing of moral (prescriptive) behaviors, while
simultaneously minimizing (i.e., undervaluing) immoral (proscriptive) behaviors
(neglect pathway).
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3.) Power (via prescriptive moral regulation) produces an automatic boost in moral
self-regard that licenses future immoral behaviors (high moral self-regard
pathway).
Hypotheses 2 and 3 represent the two possible self-regulatory routes from power to
corruption. In the research that follows, either, both, or neither of these two hypotheses
could be supported.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: POWER PROMOTES A FOCUS ON APPROACH-BASED MORALITY
Study 1 focused on establishing the association between power and prescriptive
moral regulation using explicit measures of moral judgment. Using two different selfreport measures, we explored the relationship between power and the extent to which
participants believed people should or should not engage in moral and immoral
behaviors. The two moral judgment measures differed in meaningful ways: the first
measure of moral dilemmas mixed moral and immoral behaviors in each scenario and
asked participants to evaluate them together; this is a new measure developed for this
research. The second measure separated out moral and immoral behaviors to produce a
relative preference for prescriptive versus proscriptive moral regulation; this is a measure
of prescriptive-proscriptive morality developed and used in previous research (e.g.,
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Sheik & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). We believed it
was particularly important to include the former measure of morality because it provides
a realistic context for moral decision-making – that is, a trade-off between moral and
immoral behaviors in a single situation.
In Study 1 we hypothesized that powerholders’ approach-based moral regulation
should produce overvaluing of moral prescriptions (“shoulds”) compared to moral
proscriptions (“should nots”) across both moral judgment measures. Specifically, we
expected that powerholders’ approval of prescriptive behaviors would be higher and their
disapproval of immoral behavior would be lower compared to participants in low power
and control groups. Thus, we aimed to show that power is associated with the
overvaluing of prescriptions and the minimization (i.e., devaluing) of proscriptions.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 186 (131 women, 53 men and 2 unspecified) undergraduates
from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their
participation.
Materials
Power Prime. Participants were primed with type of power (high or low) using an
autobiographical task (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). For three minutes
participants wrote about a time that they had (or did not have) power over another
individual. A control group was also included; these participants were asked to describe
what they did the previous day.
Moral Dilemma Measure. Participants evaluated a series of moral dilemmas
involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes (e.g., receive van for charitable
organization by providing a receipt for twice the real value to the car dealer who donated
the van). Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the target person in each
moral scenario and to consider how they would act. For example:
As a manager, you are approached by an employee to sponsor a
charity event that will provide food and clothing for a local women’s
shelter. You have already sponsored the maximum number of events
allowed by your company, but you are still interested in finding a way
to sponsor the event, so you consider using money from your
department’s cash account. Although it violates company rules, you
consider taking money from your department’s cash account to
sponsor the charity event.
Participants rated 10 moral dilemmas using scales tailored to the individual dilemmas
(see Appendix 1 for full materials). Using the example above, participants answered the
following questions: “Do you sponsor the charity event with money from the
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department’s cash account?” (responses were given as “yes” or “no”) followed by “Do
you feel you should/should not use money from the department’s cash account…?” “Do
you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to use the department’s money…?” and “What is
the likelihood that you would use the department’s cash...?” Using separate 9-point
scales, participants reported their moral attitude (1= “very strongly should not” to 9 =
“very strongly should”); acceptability judgment (1=“completely unacceptable” to 9 =
“completely acceptable”); and likelihood judgment (1 =“not at all likely” to 9 =
“extremely likely”). The reliabilities for the 10-item scales of moral attitude, acceptability
and likelihood judgments were .681, .681, and .660.
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). This 20-item measure consisted of 10
prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. Each item described a scenario in
which the target person is deciding whether or not to engage in a particular behavior. For
prescriptive items, these are behaviors the person presumably should engage in to be
considered moral, whereas for proscriptive items, these are behaviors the person
presumably should not engage in to be considered moral.
Prescriptive items represented behaviors involving benevolence or
industriousness, and included volunteering two hours for a local food drive, working
especially long and hard to meet a deadline for one’s job, going out to find one’s own
place after staying with a friend for many weeks in her small apartment, and giving
money to a homeless person on the street. The latter scenario, for example, was written
as follows: “Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare
some change. There’s a local shelter that costs $2.00 a night that Mary knows about.
Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the $2.00 instead.”
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Proscriptive scenarios represented behaviors involving personal temptations or
behaviors that indicate a desire or willingness to disregard social norms. Scale items
were informed by the work of Haidt (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004)
and Shweder (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) in broadening the traditional
focus of morality (also see Krebs, 2008). Examples included “excessive” gambling,
wearing a skimpy dress to a funeral, painting a house bright pink and purple in a modest,
well-kept neighborhood, and going into greater debt to purchase an expensive TV. The
debt scenario, for example, was written as follows: “Sarah is getting more and more into
debt with her credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly
furniture for her apartment. She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of
buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into greater debt.” This instance is
intended to draw on moral motives associated with restraint from temptation and selfindulgence.
In each case, participants were presented with a target person who is considering a
particular behavior (a “good” behavior in the case of prescriptive, and a “bad” behavior
in the case of proscriptive) and was asked to rate the extent to which they viewed the
decision to be a matter of personal preference (1 = “not at all a matter of personal
preference” and 9 = “completely a matter of personal preference”) and the extent to
which they believed the person in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior
(1 = “feel very strongly he/she should not” to 9 = “feel very strongly he/she should”). The
reliabilities for PreM and ProM personal preference ratings were .85 and .82, and for the
PreM and ProM moral weight ratings they were .76 and .77.
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Moral Esteem Scale. This 8-item scale was an adaptation of the Rosenberg (1962)
Self-Esteem measure. Sample items included: “I feel that I am a person of moral self
worth, at least on an equal plane with others” “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a
moral failure, ” “When it comes to morality, on the whole I am satisfied with myself.”
Participants rated the extent to which they disagree/agree with each item (1 = “very
strongly disagree” to 7 = “very strongly agree”). The reliability for Moral Esteem was
.91.
Procedure
Participants took part in an online study that consisted of three priming
conditions: high power, low power, or control followed by the Moral Dilemmas Scale,
Moralisms Scale, and standard demographics. After completing the study, participants
were thanked for their involvement and given a debriefing document that explained the
research goals.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, high power participants, compared to low power and control,
indicated greater acceptance of immoral behaviors that lead to moral outcomes; means
were 4.10 versus 3.51 and 3.55, respectively, F(2, 185) = 5.571, p <.005. As shown in
Figure 2, high power participants’ greater acceptance of moral dilemmas provides
suggestive evidence that high power leads to a focus on prescriptions by overvaluing
prescriptive moral ends and undervaluing proscriptive immoral means. Interestingly,
differences were not found on the other Moral Dilemma subscales, which were likely less
direct measures of moral judgments. For example, the should/should not scale may have
reflected societal rather than personal views while the likelihood scale may have reflected

31

recognition of other factors that contribute to these decisions. The yes/no item was
probably too crude to capture moral judgments accurately.1 Moral self-esteem did not
differ by group and will not be discussed in further analyses.
We also tested for condition effects on the Moralisms Scale. We hypothesized
that high power participants, compared to low power and control, would have higher
scores for prescriptive morality and lower scores for proscriptive morality. Means were
computed for the 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) preference and
moral weight items. ProM scores were subtracted from 10 so that higher scores indicated
stronger proscriptive orientation.
Mean scores for PreM and ProM personal preference and moral weight scores did
not differ by power condition (see Table 1 for means). Therefore, we did not find direct
confirmation for the prediction that compared to low power and control groups, high
power participants would have higher prescriptive and lower proscriptive scores on the
Moralisms Scale. However, a closer look at the correlations between PreM and ProM
moral weight scores provided some preliminary evidence for hypothesis-supporting
differences based on power. Interestingly, PreM and ProM moral weight scores were
uncorrelated for high power (r = .052, n.s.), strongly positively correlated for low power
participants (r = .372, p<.001) and marginally positively correlated for control (r = .206,
n.s.). These divergent correlations shed light on how power may change the relationship
between these two systems of morality. For low power individuals, and to some extent
for control participants as well, prescriptive and proscriptive morality were interrelated;
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The Moral Dilemma acceptability subscale was much stronger alone than combined with
the should/should not, likelihood and yes/no measures, so it will be the sole measure used
for the remainder of the paper.
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the desire to engage in moral behavior was associated with the desire to avoid engaging
in immoral behavior. In contrast, high power individuals seemed to treat prescriptive and
proscriptive morality as fairly independent systems; attitudes about moral behaviors did
not necessarily predict their attitudes towards immoral behaviors. Importantly, the
separable nature of prescriptive and proscriptive morality for high power participants
may help explain why immoral behaviors are viewed as acceptable when they lead to
moral outcomes.
As illustrated in Table 2, correlations between PreM and ProM scores and
acceptability judgments also differed by power condition. For high power participants,
PreM scores were positively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas, but ProM
scores were negatively associated with these dilemmas. For low power participants both
PreM and ProM scores were negatively associated with acceptance of moral dilemmas.
Similarly, PreM and ProM scores were negatively associated with acceptance of moral
dilemmas for the control group. We conducted Fischer z-tests to examine if the
correlations for PreM and ProM scores and acceptability judgments were significantly
different by power conditions. The correlation for PreM scores and acceptability
judgments were significantly different for high and low power (z = 3.31, p<.001) as well
as high power and control (z = 1.77, p = .038). The correlations for ProM and
acceptability judgments were marginally different for high and low power (z =-1.14, p =
.079), but not statistically different for high power and control. These results provide
additional evidence that priming power may influence how individuals differentially
emphasize the two systems of morality (prescriptive and proscriptive) when making
moral judgments.
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Given the previous results, we examined the joint effect of power and individual
scores of prescriptive morality to predict acceptance of immoral behavior. We
hypothesized that the combined effect of high power and prescriptive morality would be
associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior. Hierarchical moderated multiple
regression was used to predict acceptance of moral dilemma items. In Step 1 the dummy
coded variables for power condition and prescriptive morality scores were entered. In
Step 2 the interaction terms for prescriptive morality by power condition were added. The
control condition was treated as the reference group. The addition of the interaction terms
at Step 2 indicated that the relationship between acceptance scores and prescriptive
morality varied across the power conditions, ∆R2 = .06, F(2,180) = 6.22, p = .002. As
shown in Figure 3, individuals primed with high power, who also scored relatively high
on prescriptive morality, were more accepting of immoral behaviors compared to low
power and control conditions.
Overall, the findings of Study 1 provide suggestive evidence for the neglect
pathway as tested by the first and second hypotheses. We found power led to approachbased moral regulation and promoted the overvaluing of moral (prescriptive) behaviors
while simultaneously minimizing immoral (proscriptive) behaviors. Using the Moral
Dilemma Measure, we assessed participants’ tolerance of short term immorality
(proscriptions) to achieve long term moral outcomes (prescriptions). Consistent with
hypotheses 1 and 2, high powerholders reported greater acceptance of moral dilemmas
suggesting that high power activated a type of moral regulation that prioritized
prescriptions and deprioritized proscriptions.
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Additional support for the neglect pathway came from the Moralism Scale, which
provided a relative preference for PreM versus ProM. We predicted high power
participants would be higher on PreM and lower on ProM, but did not find this main
effect. However, correlations between the two systems of morality and the moral
dilemma measure revealed interesting patterns. For only high power PreM and ProM
scores were uncorrelated, which we believe reflects the separable nature of morality for
powerholders that may help explain why they engage in both altruistic and corrupt
behaviors without costs to their moral-esteem. Further, for high power participants
acceptance of moral dilemmas was associated with PreM not ProM, suggesting that for
powerholders it was how they felt about prescriptive morality, not proscriptive morality
that mattered in judging the dilemmas. Similarly, the interaction between power and
PreM in predicting acceptability of moral dilemmas revealed that high power participants
with relatively high PreM scores were most accepting of moral dilemmas. When having
power is paired with a dispositional prescriptive focus, it produces overvaluing of
prescriptions and minimization of proscriptions; a prescriptive focus for those without
high power does not result in a similar acceptance of proscriptive immorality for the sake
of prescriptive moral outcomes.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2: POWER AND MORAL SELF-REGARD
Study 2 was designed to examine if priming power automatically shifts
participants’ moral self-regard and whether this shift influences explicit moral judgments.
Of particular interest was whether high power individuals experienced enhanced moral
self-regard that in turn produced over-regulation of prescriptive morality and decreased
concern for proscriptive moral violations (i.e., moral self-regard pathway). In Study 2 it
was important to use an implicit measure of moral esteem like the Moral Go/No-go
Association Task, because people prefer to view themselves as moral, which results in
high explicit moral esteem scores. We found no differences on explicit moral esteem in
Study 1; therefore in Study 2 we included both implicit and explicit measures of moral
esteem.
Method
Study 2 attempted to explore the relationship between power and shifts in moral
self-regard in order to determine whether high moral self-regard could help account for
the greater acceptance of immoral actions (for moral outcomes) by high power
individuals, as found in Study 1. We manipulated power (high, low, and control) using
the same procedure described in Study 1. Following the prime, participants completed an
implicit measure of moral esteem, the Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT), as
well as the Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale used in Study 1.
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Participants
Participants were 141 (114 women, 26 men and 1 unspecified) undergraduates
from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their
participation.
Materials
Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). The original Go/No-go
Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001) was designed to assess an implicit
attitude or belief by measuring the strength of association between a target category and
two poles of a given attribute dimension. The MGNAT was developed by our morality
lab and is an adaptation of the GNAT designed to assess an individual’s implicit moral
self-regard. The advantage of using the MGNAT, as opposed to other implicit measures
(e.g., a measure based on the Implicit Association Task), is that it allowed us to collect
separate associations for prescriptive and proscriptive bases of moral self-regard. In the
MGNAT the target dimensions included “self” (I, me, myself, my, mine) and “other”
(they, them, their, him, her) with the attribute poles set to “moral” (honest, help, fair,
care, generous) and “immoral” (lie, cheat, steal, unfaithful, selfish). In this task,
participants were exposed to all four types of stimuli: self, other, moral, and immoral.
After several practice trials that familiarized participants with each type (12 practice
trails for each type of stimulus), they completed four critical blocks of 60 trials each. In
one block participants were asked to give a “go” response if the word presented fit the
“moral” or “me” categories, and ignore all other types of words. Similarly, participants
were presented with trials me-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral
(counterbalanced), and were instructed to ignore all other words except for the specified
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target words. A key to this task is that exposure times to these trials were very rapid (a
matter of milliseconds), and thus errors were very common (and not only counted on by
researchers, but used in the scoring of the task). The MGNAT allowed us to measure the
ease of association (measured in number of errors, with fewer errors indicating greater
association) when “moral” versus “immoral” words were associated with “self” versus
“other.”
Moral Dilemma Measure. Using the same measure from Study 1, participants
evaluated 10 moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral outcomes
(e.g., receive donated van for charitable organization by providing a receipt for twice the
real value of the donated van to car dealer). Participants were asked to imagine
themselves as the target person in each moral scenario and to consider how they would
act. The reliabilities for the 10-item subscales of moral attitude, acceptability and
likelihood judgments were .617, .707, and .587, respectively.
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Using the same measure from Study 1,
participants evaluated 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items. The
reliabilities for PreM and ProM personal preference ratings were .795 and .781, and for
the PreM and ProM moral weight ratings they were .642 and .653.
Moral Esteem Scale. Using the same scale from Study 1, participants responded
to the adapted Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure that included 8 items measuring
moral esteem. The reliability for Moral Esteem was .869.2

2

We did not find any group differences on explicit moral esteem nor were explicit and
implicit moral esteem correlated (i.e., d’ prime scores of MGNAT). Correlations between
explicit moral esteem and d’ prime scores were: self-moral (r = .084, n.s.), self-immoral
(r = -.152, n.s.), other-moral (r = -.053, n.s.), other-immoral (r = -.039, n.s.),
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Procedure
Participants took part in a computer-based laboratory study that consisted of three
priming conditions, followed by an implicit measure of moral esteem and two explicit
moral judgment measures. Power was manipulated using the same narrative priming task
(Galinsky et al., 2003) described in Study 1 and was directly followed by the Moral
Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). The MGNAT included four 60-trial blocks of
word associations. Afterward, participants completed the Moral Dilemmas and
Moralisms Scale and standard demographics from Study 1. Participants were thanked for
their involvement in the study and given a debriefing document that explained the
research goals.
Results and Discussion
To test the moral self-regard pathway, we predicted that power would produce
higher implicit moral regard that would be reflected in greater accuracy in response to
stimulus words associating “me” and “moral” than when responding to all other pairings
including: me-immoral, other-moral and other-immoral. We also expected that for high
power, moral regard would be related to support of prescriptions and greater acceptance
of proscriptions on the Moral Dilemma measure. We believed moral esteem would
mediate the relationship between power and moral judgments, and planned to test for this
mediation.
As seen in Figure 4, we replicated the effect from Study 1 that high power
participants, compared to low power and control, were more accepting of immoral
behaviors that lead to moral outcomes; means were 3.82 versus 3.28 and 3.68,
respectively, F(2, 137) = 2.967, p =.055. Though we replicated the acceptability effect
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from Study 1, the goal of Study 2 was to determine whether enhanced moral regard
would account for increased prescriptive decision making by powerholders. To fully
address the role of moral regard we turned to the Moral Go/No-go Association Task, a
measure of implicit moral esteem.
Analyses of the MGNAT data involved calculating participant d-prime (d’) scores
for the critical 600ms blocks using procedures outlined in Nosek and Banaji (2001) and
defined by Green and Swets (1966). Signal detection theory uses four different response
types: hits (target stimulus present & correct “go” response); misses (target stimulus
present & incorrect “no go” response); false alarms (target stimuli absent & incorrect
“go” response); and correct rejections (target stimuli absent & correct “no go” response).
Importantly, these four response types differentiate between participants’ correct “go”
responses (i.e. signal) and incorrect “go” responses (i.e. noise) to determine signal
sensitivity, d-prime (d’). As described by Nosek and Banaji, “sensitivity is calculated as
(1) the proportion of hits […] and false alarms [….] each converted to z-scores; (2) a
difference between z-score values for hits and false alarms is d-prime” (pp. 634).
We tested the prediction that high power participants would experience enhanced
moral regard with greater accuracy (i.e., fewer association errors) in response to stimulus
words for self-moral pairings compared to self-immoral, other-moral and other-immoral
pairings. Using a repeated measures analysis we compared the four d’prime scores (selfmoral, self-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral pairings) as within-subject variables
across the three power conditions (high power, low power, and control). The condition
by d’ prime score interaction was not significant, F(2, 135) = 2.188, p =.116. High power
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participants, compared to low power and control, were not more accurate on self-moral
associations compared to the other three association pairings.
We also tested the prediction that high power participants would be more accurate
on self-moral pairings compared to low power and control participants. One-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no effect of power condition on accuracy of selfmoral pairings. That is, high power, low power, and control exhibited roughly equal selfmoral association scores with means of 1.32, 1.15 and .97, respectively. Further
examination of participant d’ prime scores revealed no significant differences for othermoral and other-immoral pairings3 based on power group. Since we were not able to
confirm the prediction that power leads to enhanced moral regard via greater accuracy on
self-moral pairings we did not have cause to test moral-esteem as a mediator for power
and acceptability judgments.
The findings of Study 2 did not provide support for the moral self-regard pathway
as specified by hypothesis 3--powerholders’ approach-based morality would boost
implicit moral-esteem, and thus license immoral behaviors and judgments. Using the
MGNAT to assess implicit associations, high powerholders were not more accurate in
their associations for self-moral pairings compared to other pairings, nor were they more
accurate for self-moral pairing compared to low power and control participants. Further,
overall correlations between d’ prime scores and acceptability judgments were
uncorrelated, and there was no association when broken down by power condition. The
MGNAT is a relatively new measure developed by our lab and is currently being tested

3

There was a marginal effect for self-immoral pairings, F (2, 136) = 1.791, p =.060, but
post hoc analyses revealed that this effect was driven by the control group (M = .685)
compared to the high and low power groups (Ms = 1.049 and .842, respectively).
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in a number of studies. Data from other studies (including Study 3 of this project)
suggests that the MGNAT does provide some sensitivity for picking up differences, but
perhaps the lack of difference in Study 2 reflects the relative stability of moral esteem.
In Study 2, having power once again led to more prescriptive decision making—
that is, greater acceptance of proscriptive immorality for the sake of prescriptive moral
outcomes. Those primed with power seemed to prioritize prescriptive moral outcomes
and deprioritize proscriptive morality. However, we did not find evidence that this effect
was due to higher moral self-regard for those primed with power. In other words the high
moral self-regard pathway to immorality was not supported by the study’s findings.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 3: BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POWER ON
HELPING AND CHEATING
Study 3 built upon the prior two studies’ findings by further testing the
relationship between power and moral regulation, and by focusing on power-based
differences in prescriptive and proscriptive morality, explored here through actual
behaviors. After being primed with power, participants were asked to engage in a
behavioral activity of helping and cheating (counterbalanced). By examining the
relationship between power and the initial (i.e., Time 1) behavior, Study 3 allowed us to
test whether power is associated with specific patterns of helping and cheating,
particularly greater levels of prescriptive morality and proscriptive immorality.
Method
Participants
Participants were 1414 (93 women, 30 men and 18 unspecified) undergraduates
from the Psychology Department subject pool who received experimental credit for their
participation.
Materials
Cheating Task (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). This activity is an extension of previous
cheating measures (von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005), which presented participants
with a real opportunity to cheat on a laboratory task. Participants were asked to calculate
20 individually presented mental-arithmetic problems (e.g., 1 + 8 +18 – 12 + 19 – 7 + 17
4

At the end of Study 3 we asked participants if they were suspicious of the experimental
tasks or instructions. We had reason to exclude 12 paricipants from the analyses based
on suspicion. However, reanalyzing the data without these participants did not change
any of the results. Therefore, we are reporting the results from the complete data set.
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– 2 + 8 – 4 = ?). Participants were told that the computer program contained a glitch that
revealed the solution if participants right-clicked their computer mouse. The
experimenter explained that the researcher would not know if participants right-clicked
the computer mouse, but that they should try to solve the problems honestly. In actuality,
the computer program was designed to show the solution if the participant right-clicked
their computer mouse and would record the number of times the participants right-clicked
the mouse during the math problems. We also recorded the number of truthful attempts
before participants right-clicked to see the solution. The dependent measure of cheating
was the number of times participants right-clicked the computer mouse to reveal the math
solution. Therefore, higher right-click counts indicate greater cheating.
Helping Measure. We asked participants to evaluate a pamphlet for a fictitious
non-profit organization, Pioneer Valley Survival Center (see Appendix F and G for
pamphlet). The pamphlet described the Pioneer Valley Survival Center’s role in the
community by providing meals, clothing, medical services, and outreach programs, and
also noted that they continually looked for financial support for these programs. After
viewing the pamphlet for three minutes, participants used separate 7-point scales to
evaluate whether the pamphlet was informative (1= “not at all informative” to 7 =
“extremely informative”), attractive (1= “not at all attractive” to 7 = “extremely
attractive”) and if the Pioneer Valley Survival Center served an important role in the
community (1= “not at all important” to 7= “extremely important”).
At the bottom of the evaluation form participants were informed that as part of the
experiment they would be entered into a lottery to win $50. The researcher would select
seven students to win $50 each, and participants were asked if they won the lottery
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whether they would be willing to donate any of the $50 to the Pioneer Valley Suvival
Center. Participants filled out the lottery entry form at the bottom of the evaluation task
with their name, contact information (e.g., phone number or email address), and the
amount of money they would like to donate. Participants removed the entry form and
placed their own slip into a locked ballot box in the laboratory. After data collection
concluded, seven students were selected to win $50 each, and from this pool of money
$130 was actually donated to the Northampton Surivival Center (265 Prospect Street
Northampton, MA 01060).
Moral Go/No-go Association Task (MGNAT). Participants completed the same
MGNAT used in Study 2. The MGNAT measured implicit moral esteem via ease of
association in number of errors (with fewer errors indicating greater association) when
“moral” versus “immoral” words were associated with “self” versus “other.”
Moral Dilemma Measure. Using the same measure from Studies 1 and 2,
participants evaluated 10 moral dilemmas involving immoral actions that produced moral
outcomes. The reliabilities for the 10-item subscales of moral attitude, acceptability and
likelihood judgments were .619, .685, and .633, respectively.
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Using the same measure from Studies 1
and 2, participants evaluated 10 prescriptive (PreM) and 10 proscriptive (ProM) items.
Only PreM and ProM moral weight ratings were recorded in Study 3 with reliabilities of
.540 and .533, respectively.
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Moral Esteem Scale. Using the same scale from Studies 1 and 2, explicit moral
esteem was measured using the adapted Rosenberg (1962) Self-Esteem measure. The
reliability for Moral Esteem was .8745.
Procedure
Participants took part in a study that consisted of three priming conditions
followed by both cheating and helping behavioral tasks (counterbalanced). Participants
also completed the MGNAT, Moral Dilemmas and Moralisms Scale, and standard
demographics from Studies 1 and 2. At the end of the study, participants were thanked
for their involvement and given a debriefing document that explained the research goals.
Results and Discussion
The goal of Study 3 was to provide another test of the neglect pathway using
actual behaviors of cheating and helping. Following from hypothesis 2, we predicted
high power participants, compared to low power and control would show increased
proscriptive behavior (i.e., greater cheating on the computer task) and increased
prescriptive behavior (i.e., larger donations on helping task). We believed this pattern of
behavior would reflect powerholders’ activation of approach-based prescriptive behavior,
while simultaneously minimizing the immorality of proscriptions and failing to inhibit
these behaviors.
Proscriptive Behavior
Does power lead to increased cheating? To test this prediction we analyzed the
computerized cheating task by creating several cheating indexes, including total cheating
across the 20 math equations (i.e., total number scored as 1 – 20) and average number of

5

Consistent with Study 1 we did not find any group differences on explicit moral-esteem.
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honest attempts before cheating (i.e., average number of incorrect answers submitted
before right-clicking for the solution). There were no condition effects for either total
cheating, F(2, 138) = .507, p = .603, or average number of honest attempts before
cheating, F(2, 42) =.989, p =.380. Further, a chi-square test revealed that the power
groups did not differ in their proportion of cheating, χ2 (3, N = 141) = 3.461, p =.177.
Across all power conditions 31.9% cheated at least once while 68.1% completed the task
honestly. Moreover, for the 45 participants who cheated, the average number of times
they cheated was 5.20, with no group differences.
Prescriptive Behavior
Does power lead to increased helping? We analyzed the pledged donation amount
and the three rating items from the pamphlet evaluation task (informative, attractive, and
important) to test this prediction.
Prescriptions Predict Moral Judgments
Given the previous finding that power groups differed in their donation amounts,
we examined the interaction of power and donations6 on ratings of acceptability7, which
was completed following the cheating and helping behaviors. We hypothesized that the
combined effect of high power and higher donation (e.g., prescriptive behavior) would be
associated with greater acceptance of immoral behavior. Hierarchical moderated multiple
regression was used to predict acceptance of moral dilemma items. In Step 1 the dummy
6

Donations were positively associated with PreM for all groups, as would be expected,
and not with ProM.
7
Unlike Studies 1 and 2, there was a marginal effect of power on acceptablity judgments,
F(2,135) = 2.395, p = .095 with means for high power, low power, and control (Ms =
3.35, 3.34, and 3.78, respectively). Post hoc analyses reveal that high and low power
were moderately different from control, but not from each other. It is important to note,
however, that in this case the judgments followed actual behaviors (or restraint from
behaviors) reflecting proscriptive and prescriptive morality.
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coded variables for power condition and donation were entered. In Step 2 the interaction
terms for donation by power condition were added. The control condition was treated as
the reference group. The addition of the interaction terms at Step 2 indicated that the
relationship between the acceptance scores and donations varied across the power
conditions, ∆R2 = .038, F(2,117) = 3.238, p = .042. As shown in Figure 5, the
association between acceptance and donations is positive for the high power condition
compared to low power and control groups. Simple slope analyses revealed that the
regression line for high power is significantly different from control, b = -2.502, SE =
.013, p = .014, and moderately different from low power, b= -1.708, SE = .013, p = .09.
The finding that participants primed with power, who also pledged to give higher
donations (e.g. prescriptive behavior), was associated with greater acceptance of immoral
behavior provides additional support for the neglect pathway. We believe this pattern is a
reflection of the relationship between power and approach-based morality that makes
immoral behavior more acceptable. Conversely, for low power and control participants,
the smaller the pledged donation the more accepting they were of immoral behaviors.
Perhaps low power and control participants were attempting to normalize immoral
behavior to take the focus off their own minimal donations. Importantly, in this research
participant donations reflected donation intentions because students had not yet received
any lottery winnings. Such altruistic intentions, rather than actual acts, may play an
important role in the proscriptive behaviors (i.e., corruption) of high powerholders.
The interaction between power, donations (e.g., moral-based behavior) and moral
Donation amount was marginally different by power condition, F(2,138) = 2.587, p =
.079 with participants in the low power group donating significantly less (M = $19.68)
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than the high power and control groups (Ms were $26.33 and $27.79, respectively). In
addition, evaluations that the survival center filled an important need in the community
varied by power condition, F(2,139) = 5.372, p = .006, with low power participants rating
the survival center as less important (M = 5.74) compared to high power (M = 6.38) and
control (M = 6.21) participants. Further, ratings of pamphlet attractiveness were
marginally different for power condition, F(2,137) = 2.624, p = .076; high power
participants rated the pamphlet as most attractive (M = 4.26) compared to low power
participants (M = 3.70) and control (M = 4.05). All participants found the pamphlet to be
equally informative, F(2,137) = .625, p = .537. Interestingly, those low in power were
the most withholding of donations as well as the harshest critics of the survival center’s
importance. One possible explanation is that this reflects the relationship between low
power and inhibition-based proscriptive morality, which shifts one’s focus to avoiding
immorality rather than promoting morality. As will be discussed below, more research
needs to be done on low power and also points to the need for control groups (included
here), so often not included in past research. Judgments relates to current research on
moral licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001). Moral licensing suggests that individuals who
engage in moral behaviors initially reward themselves with “moral credits” and,
ironically, are more likely to engage in immoral behaviors afterward. Therefore, moral
licensing theory would predict that all participants (regardless of power condition) who
intended to donate would be more accepting of immoral behavior because of moral
credentialing. However, in this research we did not find a main effect of moral licensing;
instead, prescriptive intentions were more powerful (in terms of moral licensing) for high
powerholders. This result underscores the unique interplay between power and morality.
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Moral Self-Regard
Study 3 also provided a second examination of the moral self-regard pathway as
measured by the relationship between power and participants’ scores on the MGNAT. As
in Study 2, we did not find a relationship between power and participants’ four
association scores. However, further examination of participant d’prime scores revealed
significant order effects for self-immoral, other-moral, and other-immoral pairings. That
is, when participants completed the cheating task (e.g., before or after the helping task)
influenced their implicit moral association scores. For self-immoral pairings, participants
who completed the cheating task directly prior to the MGNAT had significantly higher
self-immoral association scores (M = 1.16) compared to those who donated directly prior
to the MGNAT (M =.674), F(1,139) = 17.776, p >.000. There was no effect for selfmoral pairings, which we believe is a reflection of the stability of self-moral associations.
Nevertheless, participants regarded themselves as more immoral immediately after
cheating. Similarly, other-immoral and other-moral association scores were strongest for
those who cheated directly prior (M=1.122 and M=.575 respectively) compared to those
who donated directly prior (M=.8433 and M=.575 respectively). Although these results
go beyond the scope of the current studies, they do provide preliminary evidence for the
sensitivity of the MGNAT as a tool to capture changes in implicit moral esteem.
Study 3 provides further support for the neglect pathway and suggestive evidence
that having power is associated with morally-based behaviors. Using actual behaviors, we
found high power individuals who engaged in prescriptive acts like donating were more
accepting of immoral behavior. We predicted, but did not find differences in actual
cheating nor an effect of proscriptive behaviors (e.g., cheating) on moral judgments for
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participants primed with power. Moderated multiple regression analyses were run
including cheating as a predictor of acceptability judgments, but none of the analyses
were significant. Therefore, we concluded that cheating did not moderate the relationship
between power and acceptability judgments. In this research participants had to activate
cheating behavior (e.g., right-clicked mouse to reveal solution) rather than inhibit default
cheating, used in previous studies. Perhaps this modification to activate cheating rather
than inhibit, actually suppressed the rate of overall cheating, which is why we were
unable to find the predicted relationship between power and cheating. Further,
participants completed this study in a room with two other participants and perhaps the
public setting again suppressed cheating that might have occurred in private. Future
research will refine the cheating paradigm to further test our prediction that cheating
would increase for individuals primed with high power.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
By bridging the power, self-regulation, and morality literatures we proposed that
powerful individuals, because of their approach tendencies, are oriented more towards
moral prescriptions or “shoulds” and thus focus more on moral acts and moral intentions
while minimizing the importance of moral proscriptions (neglect pathway). We proposed
an alternative pathway to corruption for powerholders via moral self-regard.
Powerholders, because of their approach-based moral focus, would experience an
automatic boost of implicit moral self-regard that would license future immorality. In
three studies we found supportive evidence for the neglect pathway (Studies 1 & 3), but
not the moral self-regard pathway (Study 2).
Past evidence for our hypotheses comes from consistent findings suggesting that
power leads to increased approach tendencies, as demonstrated through increased action,
positive affect, automatic cognition, risk taking, and socially inappropriate behavior
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). In addition, we found suggestive evidence for our
predictions from the positive social acts of corrupt individuals such as Eliot Spitzer and
Bernard Madoff. Eliot Spitzer was a proponent of same-sex marriage and voted to
provide rights to illegal immigrants, while Bernard Madoff sat on the board of numerous
charities and gave away millions of dollars. Our theoretical model helps reconcile why
these individuals simultaneously engaged in moral (prescriptive) and immoral
(proscriptive) actions.
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Across Studies 1 and 3 we found support for the neglect pathway as predicted by
hypotheses one and two. We expected individuals primed with power would be more
accepting of immoral actions that led to moral outcomes, because their prescriptive moral
focus increased their sensitivity to morality (rather than immorality). Using the Moral
Dilemma measure developed for this research, we combined immoral actions and moral
outcomes, and found that participants primed with power were more accepting of
proscriptive misdeeds for the sake of prescriptive good deeds compared to low power and
control participants (Studies 1 and 2)8. Interestingly, high powerholders were not higher
on prescriptive morality in general – that is, they didn’t have higher PreM scores on the
Moralism Scale (Study 1), nor did they donate more (Study 3). However, greater
acceptance of immorality was associated with higher PreM scores (Study 1) and
donations (Study 3) only for those primed with power. The interactions from Studies 1
and 3 suggest the importance of enhanced prescriptive focus – that is, when their
prescriptive morality is high (dispositionally or as a result of their own past actions or
intentions), they are more apt to be accepting of proscriptive (immoral) behavior.
We also proposed a second pathway to corruption involving enhanced moral-regard for
powerholders. This pathway was informed by past moral licensing research (Monin &
Miller, 2001) that found participants who engaged in an initial moral act (e.g., non-biased
hiring decision or buying environmentally friendly products) were more likely to engage
in immoral behavior afterward because of a boost in moral self-regard. Following from
this, hypothesis 3 predicted that high powerholders, because of their prescriptive moral

8

Unexpectedly, we only found a marginal effect of power on moral judgments in Study
3. However, we attribute this effect to the inclusion of morally-based behaviors (cheating
and donating) prior to the moral judgments.
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focus, would experience an automatic boost of moral regard that would license
immorality. We used a new instrument developed by our lab to measure implicit moral
esteem, Moral Go/No-go Association Task. We expected high power participants to have
stronger implicit association scores for “self” and “moral” pairings compared to all other
word pairings (self-immoral, other-moral, other-immoral), with high power also having
stronger associations on self-moral pairings compared to low power and control.
However, we did not find support for the moral self-regard pathway (Study 2). Of
note, we predicted that positive moral intentions alone—thoughts in the absence of
deeds— would be powerful enough to elicit the automatic boost of moral regard, which
we did not find. This prediction was informed by self-other biases research by Pronin
and Kugler (2007), which that suggests individuals overvalue thoughts and may ignore
behavior when engaged in self-evaluations, validating their “good” selves with good
intentions. Interestingly, in Study 3, these intentions, specifically to donate future lottery
winnings, were sufficient to produce greater acceptance of proscriptive immorality by
those primed with high power.
Although power did not relate to differences in implicit moral self-regard, high
power was still associated with a focus on prescriptions, as shown through acceptability
judgments, thereby providing additional support for the neglect pathway (Study 2). It
appears that power may not automatically make one feel more moral, but it helps one
focus on morality by prioritizing prescriptive moral outcomes. A measure of moral
esteem was included in all three studies, but there were no group differences, which we
believe is a reflection of people’s strong tendency to see themselves as moral. Bandura
and colleagues’ work on moral disengagement (1996) found ordinary individuals who
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engaged in detrimental behavior (e.g., harming another) still viewed their behavior as
moral. Moral disengagement helped keep moral-esteem intact, and may shed light on
why we found a ceiling effect for explicit moral-esteem even after participants cheated in
Study 3. Future research should examine the relationship between power and moral
esteem (implict and explicit) for those with real, not manipulated power.
Overall, this research supports the conclusion that for powerholders the neglect
pathway is the operative path by which power may lead to moral transgressions, a form
of corruption. In three studies we found suggestive evidence that the approach tendencies
of powerholders maximized the role of good moral acts and intentions and minimized the
impact of moral transgressions, because the individual’s monitoring system focused on
and valued instances of moral successes (i.e., good behavior and intentions) rather than
moral failures (i.e., bad behavior and intentions). We did not find support for the moral
self-regard pathway, and therefore cannot conclude that moral esteem mediates the
relationship between power and acceptance of immorality. The take home message from
this project is that powerful individuals regulated their moral behavior by focusing
primarily on prescriptions, “shoulds,” and less on proscriptions, “should nots,” and this
paradoxically led to greater acceptance of immoral behavior.
Limitations and Future Research
Although this research project provides many insights into the relationship
between power and morality, it is critical to extend this work to other samples of
powerholders. Will these results generalize to individuals in chronic positions of high
power (e.g., business or political leaders)? Perhaps the degree of these effects is
proportional to the amount of power one possesses. Another issue closer to this project,
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is teasing apart the differences between high and low power. In Study 3 we found that
low power participants viewed the charitable organization more as a matter of personal
preference rather than mandatory. We did not predict this relationship and there is not
much literature that speaks to the specific mechanisms for low power individuals;
therefore future research would be well served to continue to include control groups, as in
this project. There are important theoretical reasons to tease apart the low power
construct, because the term may confound two very different experiences. On the one
hand, people low in power may know they are in a subordinate position, but may not
desire or know how to change their situation. Alternatively, those low in power may be
aware of their status and also be motivated to change their position, but may not have the
means or may be actively prevented from improving their position. Another power state
to consider, especially as it is relevant to organizational behavior, is “equivalent power” –
that is, members working together on a project who have important implications for
moral regulation. In extreme cases of corruption individuals often have partners (for
example, Bernie Madoff’s lawyer Ira Sorkin), so sharing power may be another part of
how moral regulation can lead to corruption.
Another future direction for this research is to continually refine our test of power
on implicit moral esteem. One possibility is to increase the MGNAT time window from
600ms to 750ms given that 600ms is extremely quick and may not accurately reflect
attitude-based errors. Past research by Nosek and Banaji (2001) supports this
recommendation since they find that using response windows between 500 and 850ms
accurately capture automatic attitudes. Further, using actual moral behaviors, not just
intentions, might be the key to understanding how power may boost moral-regard.
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It was surprising that we did not find any behavioral differences on cheating in Study 3.
One possibility is that the situation of being in public, as well as our modification of the
cheating task may have suppressed actual cheating behavior. Our cheating task was not
an exact replication of previous methods (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), because we had
individuals engage in cheating by right-clicking to reveal the solution compared to
methods in which participants inhibited cheating by pressing the spacebar to stop the
solution from being shown. In this way, it may be more difficult to activate cheating as
opposed to inhibiting it. Future research is needed to replicate the revised paradigm.
Further, online samples could be used to provide an anonymous setting to facilitate
cheating.
Implications of Research
Across three studies we tested whether power activated a type of moral regulation
that might make powerholders more vulnerable to corruption. We predicted two possible
paths to corruption, a neglect pathway and a moral self-regard pathway. The neglect
pathway involved power activating approach-based moral regulation that prioritized
moral “shoulds” and deprioritized moral “should nots” making immoral transgressions
more acceptable. We found confirmation for this pathway in Studies 1 and 3 by
manipulating participant power and measuring acceptance of immorality as well as
preference for dispositional morality (PreM and ProM). Specifically, high power
individuals were more accepting overall of immorality, and this relationship was
amplified when individual PreM was added. Study 3 provided an extension to Study 1 by
including behaviors of cheating and helping prior to moral judgments. The inclusion of
behaviors provided new insights into the joint effect of helping behavior and dispositional
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morality; high powerholders who pledged higher donations (prescriptive behavior) were
most accepting of immorality. The parallel nature of the findings from Studies 1 and 3 is
particularly noteworthy. High power combined with high prescriptive morality, either
dispositionally (Study 1) or via positive intentions (Study 3), seems to be a recipe for
greater immorality and corruption.
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Table 1. Means for Prescriptive and Proscriptive Moralism Items (Study 1)
Prescriptive Preference

Proscriptive Preference

High Power

6.6

6.9

Low Power

6.5

7.0

Control

6.6

7.1

Prescriptive Moral Weight

Proscriptive Moral Weight

High Power

7.3

6.6

Low Power

7.2

6.5

Control

6.8

6.5
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Table 2. Correlations Among PreM and ProM Scores and Acceptability Judgments By
Power Condition (Study 1)
High Power
PreM
ProM

Acceptability
.215
-.558**

ProM
.052
--

Low Power
PreM
ProM

Acceptability
-.370**
-.356**

ProM
.372**
--

Acceptability
-.124
-.415**

ProM
.206
--

Control
PreM
ProM

60

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Power Illustrating Dual Pathways to Corruption
(High Moral Self-Regard Pathway)
High
MSR
Power

Approach

Moral
Credit

Focus on
“Shoulds

Corruption
Co
(Neglect Pathway)
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Figure 2. Mean Difference for Acceptance of Immoral Behavior By Power Condition
(Study 1)

Acceptance of Immoral Actions
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Control

Figure 3. Acceptance of Immoral Behavior as a Function of Power Condition and
Prescriptive Morality (Study 1)
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Figure 4. Mean Difference for Acceptance of Immoral Behavior By Power Condition
(Study 2)

Acceptance of Immoral Actions
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Control

Figure 5. Acceptance of Immoral Behavior as a Function of Power Condition and
Donation Amount (Study 3)
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APPENDIX A
NARRATIVE POWER PRIMING TASK
High Power:
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or
individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another
person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those
individuals. Please describe this situation in which you had power – what happened, how
you felt, etc.
Low Power:
Please recall a particular incident in which someone else had power over you. By power,
we mean a situation in which someone had control over your ability to get something you
wanted, or was in a position to evaluate you. Please describe this situation in which you
did not have power – what happened, how you felt, etc.
Control:
Please recall what you did yesterday. Please pick one situation from you day and
describe what happened, how you felt, etc.
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APPENDIX B
MORAL DILEMMA MEASURE
1. As a manager, you are approached by an employee to sponsor a charity event that
will provide food and clothing for a local women’s shelter. You have already
sponsored the maximum number of events allowed by your company, but you are
still interested in finding a way to sponsor the event, so you consider using money
from your department’s cash account. Although it violates company rules, you
consider taking money from your department’s cash account to sponsor the charity
event.
Do you sponsor the charity event with money from the department's cash account?
_______ Yes _______ No
To what extent do you feel you should/should not use money from the department’s cash
account to sponsor the charity event?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to use money from the
department’s cash account (i.e., violate company policy) to sponsor the charity event?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

As the manager what is the likelihood that you would use the department’s cash account
to sponsor the charity event?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

2. Your lifelong best friend is turning 21 on Saturday and you agreed to help your
friends throw an elaborate surprise party. Your parents also planned a family
dinner with distant relatives, who haven’t seen you in several years, for the same
night. You can only attend one of the events on Saturday. Since there are only two
other friends handling the elaborate birthday arrangements, you consider lying to
your parents to get out of your family dinner.
Do you lie to your parents to help your friends set up for the surprise party?
_______ Yes _______ No

67

To what extent do you feel you should/should not lie to your parents to help your friends
set up for the surprise party?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to lie to your parents to help
your friends set up for the surprise party?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would lie to your parents to help your friends set up for
the surprise party?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

3. You need to get your spouse a present to celebrate your first wedding
anniversary. You manage an electronics store in the mall, so you have access to
special gifts your spouse will like, but you cannot afford. Coincidentally, you are
scheduled to restock the store’s inventory the night before your anniversary, so it
would be easy to take one of the products without paying. Although illegal, you
consider taking the product to make your spouse happy on your anniversary.
Do you steal merchandise from the store you manage to give your spouse a special gift on
your first anniversary? _______ Yes _______ No
To what extent do you feel you should/should not steal the merchandise from the store
you manage to give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to steal merchandise from the
store you manage to give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary?
completely
completely
unacceptable
neutral
acceptable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

68

What is the likelihood that you would steal the merchandise from the store you manage to
give your spouse a special gift on your first anniversary?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

4. You work in the informational technology division of your company and are
responsible for monitoring emails. You receive a help request from one of your
friends to “unsend” an angry email to your boss that he intended to delete, but
accidentally sent. Deleting emails is strictly prohibited and could cost you your job,
but if the email is read by your boss it will likely result in your friend’s firing.
Do you help your friend delete an email (i.e., violate company rules)? _______ Yes
_______ No
To what extent do you feel you should/should not help your friend delete an email (i.e.
violate company rules)?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to help your friend delete an
email (i.e. violate company rules)?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would help your friend delete an email (i.e. violate
company rules)?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

5. A patient calls late Friday to inquire about a test result. You look up the patient’s
file and see that his test results show he is healthy and needn’t worry all weekend.
However, you are only a lab assistant and it is a violation of company policy for you
to tell patients their test results. You consider telling the patient the results of their
test even though it is a violation of company policy.
Do you tell the patient their results (i.e., violate company policy)?
_______ No
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_______ Yes

To what extent do you feel you should/should not tell the patient their results (i.e., violate
company policy)?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to tell the patient their results
(i.e., violate company policy)?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would tell the patient their results (i.e., violate company
policy)?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

extremely
likely
8
9

7

6. You run a local food bank which needs a van to deliver meals to the homebound
members of your community. A used car dealer will donate one if you agree to
provide a receipt for twice its real value. What do you do?
Do you agree to provide a receipt for twice the real value of the donated van?
Yes _______ No

______

To what extent do you feel you should/should not agree to provide a receipt for twice the
real value of the donated van?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to agree to provide a receipt for
twice the real value of the donated van?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would agree to provide a receipt for twice the real value
of the donated van?
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not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

extremely
likely
8
9

7

7. You are running a few errands for your grandparent and you are using their car,
which has a handicapped license plate. The only convenient spot in the store
parking lot is reserved for the handicapped. You’re in a hurry and won’t be there
long. Do you park there?
Do you park in the handicapped spot although you are not actually handicapped?
_______ Yes _______ No
To what extent do you feel you should/should not park in the handicapped spot although
you are not actually handicapped?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to park in the handicapped spot
although you are not actually handicapped?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would park in the handicapped spot although you are not
actually handicapped?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

8. Your wife is in labor and needs to get the hospital immediately. You approach a
school zone and see that no one is outside. The school zone speed limit is clearly
marked at 15 mph, but you are currently traveling at 45mph to get your wife to the
hospital as quickly as possible. Do you to speed through the school zone even though
it is against traffic laws?
Do you speed through the school zone even though it is against traffic laws?
Yes _______ No

_______

To what extent do you feel you should/should not speed through the school zone even
though it is against traffic laws?
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feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to speed through the school zone
even though it is against traffic laws?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would speed through the school zone even though it is
against traffic laws?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

9. You are a doctor that specializes in pain management and one of your terminally
ill patients takes a turn for the worse. The patient asks you to euthanize them to end
their suffering, but euthanasia is outlawed in your state. Do you break the law to
help end your patient’s continued suffering?
Do you break the law to help end your patient’s continued suffering?
_______ No

_______ Yes

To what extent do you feel you should/should not break the law to help end your patient’s
continued suffering?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to break the law to help end your
patient’s continued suffering?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would break the law to help end your patient’s continued
suffering?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5
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6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

10. You unexpectedly got your high school girlfriend pregnant, you marry her and
raise the child together. However, you are a high school dropout and are unable to
find any jobs. To make ends meet you sell drugs out of your apartment. Although
against the law, you consider continuing to sell drugs to support your family. What
do you do?
Do you continue to sell drugs to support your family?

_______ Yes _______ No

To what extent do you feel you should/should not continue to sell drugs to support your
family?
feel very strongly
should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

feel very strongly
should
8
9

To what extent do you feel it is unacceptable/acceptable to continue to sell drugs to
support your family?
completely
unacceptable
1

2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

completely
acceptable
8
9

What is the likelihood that you would continue to sell drugs to support your family?
not at all
likely
1

2

3

4

neutral
5
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6

7

extremely
likely
8
9

APPENDIX C
MORALISMS SCALE
Some decisions are “up to you”---there isn’t a clear right or wrong answer, or a better or
worse choice. One such decision might be choosing a flavor of ice cream. Such
decisions are completely a matter of personal preference. Other decisions, such as killing
an innocent person, are clearly matters of right or wrong behavior and not matters of
personal preference.
For each situation described below first please indicate (i.e., circle the number) the degree
to which you think the decision is a matter of personal preference. Then indicate how
strongly you feel the person in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior
presented. There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales
below that best represents your response.
1. Tim is overweight and has already eaten two hamburgers and a large order of
fries. He is full, but he really likes the onion rings at the restaurant, so he considers
ordering a third burger and an order of onion rings.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Tim should or should not order the third burger and onion rings?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

2. Stacy is a pre-med student and has an early morning chemistry class. She intends
to go to class, but finds it hard to get up early. She could just miss class and get the
notes from other students, but considers waking up early anyway to get to class on
time.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Stacy should get up, attend class, and take the notes herself?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
3. Susan has a large friendly dog who likes to run free. There is a leash law in her

town that states dogs should be leashed in public, but Susan is thinking of letting her
dog run free on the bike trail in town.
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To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Susan should or should not let her dog run free on the bike trail in
town?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

4. Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare some
change. There’s a local shelter that costs $2.00 a night that Mary knows about.
Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the $2.00
instead.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Mary should or should not give the homeless man money?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

5. Jill is applying for a competitive year-long internship. Her uncle knows someone
at the firm that is offering the internship. Jill could ask her uncle to pull strings for
her, but she considers instead working hard on her application and trying to get the
position on her own merits.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Jill should work hard on her application and try to get the position on
her own merits?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

6. Cory is in the supermarket, where he sees an elderly woman having trouble
carrying her groceries. He is in a hurry and knows he could ignore her, but
considers instead helping the elderly woman carry her groceries.
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To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Cory should or should not help the elderly woman with her groceries?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

7. Justin is a student artist and likes to paint graffiti in public areas, even though the
city’s policy prohibits it. He believes people like his work, and while waiting alone
in a subway station, Justin considers painting some colorful graffiti on a blank wall
in the station.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Justin should or should not paint some colorful graffiti on a blank wall
in the station?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

8. Chris needs one more math course to complete his college requirements. He is
taking a math course that is much too easy for him, because he has already been
taught all the material in another class. He considers taking a more difficult course
that would challenge him and teach him something new.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Chris should or should not take a more difficult math course?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

9. Sam really likes pornography on the web. He already spent two hours earlier in
the day on an online pornography site. He just returned to his apartment and
considers immediately going online to a pornography website.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Sam should or should not immediately go online to a pornography
website?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10. Ellen moved to the city and is staying with a friend, who says she is welcome to
stay until she finds her own apartment. Ellen’s friend works long hours and is
rarely at home. Ellen could just put off finding her own place to live, but considers
looking for one as soon as she can.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Ellen should or should not start looking for her own apartment?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

11. Melanie and Scott have just bought a house in a quiet, middle-class
neighborhood. The homes are not fancy, but are modest and well-kept. Melanie and
Scott are considering ignoring the community and painting their house bright
orange with green trim.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Melanie and Scott paint their house bright orange with green trim?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
they should not
neutral
they should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

12. Brenda and Dan just finished an expensive dinner at a fine local restaurant. The
bill is accurate, but is far more expensive than they thought it would be. The waiter
was good. Brenda and Dan know they could just leave a small tip, but consider
spending more money to give the waiter an appropriate larger amount.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Brenda and Dan should or should not leave the waiter a good tip?
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feel very strongly
they should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

8

feel very strongly
they should
9

13. Linda had a great time with Bob. When they go back to her apartment, it’s
clear she and Bob want to have sex. Neither of them have contraceptive protection,
but they consider having sex anyway.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Linda and Bob should or should not have sex anyway?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
they should not
neutral
they should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

14. Jason has a big project to complete for an important client, and it is due by the
end of the day. He knows he could give the work to two new interns, but he
considers staying late and doing a good job finishing the project himself.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Jason should or should not stay late and finish the project himself?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

15. Sheila is going to a funeral, and it’s an unusually hot day. She is thinking of
wearing a skimpy, revealing dress to keep her relatively cool at the funeral.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Sheila should or should not wear a skimpy, revealing dress to the
funeral?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

16. Brian loves to gamble and particularly likes going to the racetrack. He’s been
on a losing streak and knows he should quit his habit, but he just got his paycheck
and considers going back to the track to gamble.
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To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Brian should or should not go back to the track?
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

feel very strongly
he should
9

17. While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer
two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center. Jay
doesn’t have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to
helping with the food drive.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Jay should or should not help with a food drive for the local survival
center?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card. She recently bought
lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start
saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV
and going into even deeper debt.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Sarah should or should not buy the TV and go into greater debt?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19. Dana is cleaning out her closet and finds her old American flag. She has no need

for the flag anymore, so she is thinking of cutting it up into small pieces that she can
use as rags to clean her house.
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Dana should or should not cut the American flag into pieces to be
used as rags?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

20. Ned inherited a lot of money and has cut back on work to manage his
investments. He is approached by a foundation that that has been successful at
setting up job-training for the poor and is in need of additional funding. Ned is
trying to decide whether to donate money for the foundation
To what extent do you think this a matter of personal preference?
not at all a matter of
personal preference
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

completely a matter of
personal preference
8
9

To what extent do you feel Ned should or should not donate money to the foundation?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

PROSCRIPTIVE items: 1, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19
PRESCRIPTIVE items: 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20
(Note: To make the Proscriptive and Prescriptive should/should not scales comparable,
subtract the Proscriptive scores from 10. The Proscriptive and Prescriptive personal
preference scores are comparable as is.)
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APPENDIX D
PAMPHLET EVALUATION TASK
We are interested in getting your feedback for the Pioneer Survival Center pamphlet.
There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales below that
best represents your response.
1. How informative was the pamphlet?
Not at all
informative
1
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
informative
7

6

Extremely
attractive
7

2. How visually attractive was the pamphlet?
Not at all
attractive
1
2

3

4

5

3. To what extent do you think the Pioneer Survival Center fills an important need in the
community?
Not at all
important
1
2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
important
7

Thank you!
As thanks for completing this task you will be entered into a lottery. The lottery
will select seven (7) students who will each win $50. Please fill out and detach the entry
form below. Place you completed submission in the box marked “Lottery.”

Name: _________________________________________________
Contact info (e-mail/telephone): ____________________________________________
If you win this $50 lottery how much of the total would you be willing to donate to the
Pioneer Survival Center? (We would deduct this amount from the check we send you.)
$________
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APPENDIX E
MORAL SELF ESTEEM

1. I feel that I’m a person of moral worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

2. I feel that I have a number of good moral qualities.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

3. All I all, I am inclined to feel that I am a moral failure.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Agree
7

4. When it comes to morality, I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

Strongly Agree
7

5

6

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

5. I take a positive attitude toward my moral self.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

6. When it comes to morality, on the whole I am satisfied with myself.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

5

6

Strongly Agree
7

5

6

Strongly Agree
7

7. I wish I could have more respect for my moral self.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

8. At times I think I am not morally good at all.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4
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APPENDIX F
HELPING BEHAVIOR MEASURE (FRONTSIDE OF PAMPHLET)

PIONEER
SURVIVAL

The Pioneer Survival Center opened in
November of 1979. The initial funding
for the Center came from community
donations.

CENTER

The Pioneer Survival Center is
an emergency food pantry
that provides low-income
individuals and families with
free food, clothing, personal

From the minute it opened its doors, the
Survival Center fulfilled a long-standing
need: distributing food to people in
emergency situations and to help people
with low-incomes who require
assistance in making ends meet on a
short term basis. Clothing and
household items were available in the
earliest days.

care items, and referrals for

PIONEER

emergency assistance. The

SURVIVAL

Center distributes over

CENTER

650,000 pounds of food each
year.

Our Mission
The Pioneer Survival Center
strives to improve the quality of
life for low-income individuals and
families in by providing food and
other resources with dignity and
respect.
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APPENDIX G
HELPING BEHAVIOR MEASURE (BACKSIDE OF PAMPHLET)

DONATE

Kids’ Summer Food
Program:

Client Comments

During the summer months, the Pioneer Survival
Center’s Kids’ Summer Food Program provides
eligible children with free food packages to help feed
them breakfast and lunch every weekday for ten
weeks during summer vacation. Every eligible child in
the household can receive a pre-bagged package of
food which includes dry milk, cereal, fruit, juice, peanut
butter, jelly, mac & cheese, tuna, soup, and vegetables.

I appreciate the wonderful, kind

Turkeys: During the month of November, the
Survival Center distributes either a turkey or grocery
store gift card to each client family when they come in
for their regular package of groceries. We also try to
have other traditional Thanksgiving items available
such as potatoes, cranberry and squash.
Other Resources:
Personal Care Items, Pet Food, Job Training

The PSC is a non-Profit organization.
rganization.
on.
Donations of money are the lifeblood of
The Survival Center. Unlike donations of
food that rely upon scarce storage
space, your financial contributions can
be put to immediate use in buying food
when the need is greatest, and at the
best value when buying salvage, on sale,
or in bulk. Money is also needed to pay
salaries, maintain the building, buy
gasoline for the truck, and keep our
refrigerators running. Contributions of
any size are gratefully received and are
fully tax-deductible.

volunteers, the fact the place exists for
help with food and clothes, the
patience, amiableness and warmth with
the people here and their aim to
accommodate.

The food provided some months makes
the difference between hunger and
eating. The center has also acted as a
networking tool for access to other
needed services. The staff is friendly
and helpful.
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VOLUNTEER
The Pioneer Survival Center’s dedicated
volunteer community plays an integral role
in our 32-year success providing food and
other resources to low-income individuals
and families with dignity and respect.
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